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STATUTORY LIENS UNDER SECTION 67c OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
FEDERAL tax liens and a proliferation of state statutory liens and priorities,
enacted by legislatures to favor such local creditors as wage earners, land-
lords, contractors, and taxing agencies, at one time threatened to disrupt
the order of payment contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act.1 Prior to 1938,
statutory lienors satisfied their claims before: junior lienors un the same
property, creditors with priorities granted by Section 64a of the Bankruptcy
Act, and general creditors.2 And, unlike consensual liens, statutory liens
could not be voided as preferential transfers. 'Moreover, holders of state
statutory priorities received a seventh priority under Section 64a, entitling
them to satisfy their claims before general creditors: The claims of favored
creditors, particularly wage and tax lienors and the multiple state priority
holders, often exhausted the bankrupt's estate before either Section 64a
priorities or general creditors received any benelit.-5 As a result, Congreis
took remedial action.
The 1938 Bankruptcy Act amendments withdrew recognition entirely from
state statutory priorities 6 and partially restricted the protection afforded
statutory liens. Section 67b, when read with 67c, continues the immunity
of statutory liens on realty from the trustee's power to void preferential
transfers. 7 But under 67c, all liens of distress for rent, whether or not statu-
tory, on personal property, which have not been enforced by sale prior to
1. AxLysis or H.R.-12S89, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (193t,); H.R. -.'o. 14fJ), 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1937); 4 CoLLiER, BA.NR nvrrcy 103 n.1 (14th td., Mo, re, 1942).
2. Miners' Say. Bank of Pittston v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973 (3d Cir. 193S); In re Kerby-
Dennis Co., 95 Fed. 116 (7th Cir. 1899). See In re Van Winkle, 40 F. Sujpp. 711, 713 (W.D.
Ky. 1943). Cf. Inre Edmunds, 31) F. Supp. 934 (M.D. Pa. 1940) (lien of distre~s for rent).
3. 3 Co~u~p, op. cit. supra note 1, at 799.
4. 44 STAT. 666 (1926). In re Consolidated Iron & Steel Co., 76 F2d -37 (tth Cir.
1935) ; In re Lewis, 99 Fed. 935 (D. Mass. 1900) ; In re Wright, 95 Fed. ,u7 (D. Ma~s.
1899).
5. See materials cited note 1 stpra.
6. Except rent priorities, which were given 5th (last) place in the federal priority
scheme, and restricted to "rent which is legally due and owing for the actual ue and
occupancy of the premises affected, and which accrued within three months Lbfore the
date of bankruptcy." 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (5) (194t)).
7. Section 67 (b) provides: "The provision of section 60... notwithstanding, statutory
liens . . . may be valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the
debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the petition... :' 52 STAT.
876 (1938), as amended, 66 STr.k. 427, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b) (Supp. 1952). The word
"may" has been construed as mandatory. Davis v. City of New Yurk, 119 P2d 559
(2d Cir. 1941) ; In re Valade Refrigerator Mfg. Co., 75 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Mich. 1947);
In re Famous Furniture Co., 42 F. Supp. 777 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
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bankruptcy, must be postponed in payment to the first two priorities of 64a.8
All other state and federal statutory liens on personal property, which are
not enforced by sale prior to bankruptcy 0 and are not accompanied by posses-
sion, 10 must also be postponed in the same manner." When rent or wage
liens are so subordinated, they are paid only to the extent permitted for the
64a rent and wage priorities.12 Nevertheless, subordinated statutory lienors
are likely to fare better than if they never had a lien; without a lien an
8. See It re Henry, 49 F. Supj. 957 (W.D. Pa. 1943); In re Jay & Dee Store Co.,
37 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1941), concurring opinion, 39 F. Supp. 588 (1941) ; In re Lebed,
39 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
Landlords have sought to avoid postponement by avoiding the label of "lien of distress
for rent." Compare In re Kocialek, 32 F. Supp. 228 (M.D. Pa. 1940), with In re Lebed,
39 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Pa. 1941). See also In re Allen, 92 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Tex. 1950);
4 COLLIER, BANRU'PTCv 164 n.40 (14th ed., Moore, 1942).
9. If encumbered property is sold before the bankruptcy petition is filed, the lien is
not affected. It re Valade Refrigerator Mfg. Co., 75 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Mich. 1947);
It re Kentucky Book Mfg. Co., 30 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
10. Absence of possession resulted in postponement in the following eases: City of
Dallas v. Crippen, 171 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1948); City of New York v. Hall, 139 F.2d
935 (2d Cir. 1944) ; It re Burch, 89 F. Supp. 249 (D. Kan. 1948) ; In re Empire Granite
Co., 42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942) ; In re Auto Electric & Repair Parts Co,, 41 F.
Supp. 3 (W.D. Ky. 1941); In -re Penticoff, 36 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1941).
Possession allowed lienor to escape postponement in the following cases: Goggln v.
Division of Labor Law Enforcement of California, 336 U.S. 118 (1943) ; United States
v. Sands, 174 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1949). Cf. Gordon v. Sullivan, 188 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
11. Postponed liens are usually ranked in the same order they would have had if not
postponed. The order is governed by applicable state and federal statutes. In re Burch,
89 F. Supp. 249 (D. Kan. 1948); In re Auto Electric & Repair Parts Co., 41 F. Supp. 3
(W.D. Ky. 1941). Cf. Adams v. O'Malley 182 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1950).
Postponement protects claims for bankruptcy administration expenses, and wage claims
up to $600 per claimant. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1936). See
City of New York v. Hall, 139 F.2d 935, 936 (2d Cir. 1944) ; In re Jay & Dee Store Co.,
37 F. Supp. 989, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
One result of postponing a lien might be to allow an unpostponed junior lien on
the same property to pre-empt payment of administration expenses and small wage claims,
See New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943) ; In re Empire Granite Co,,
42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942).
12. Wage claims are restricted to the amount earned within three months prior to
the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, not to exceed $600 per claimant. Rent
claims are restricted to the amount accrued within three months before the date of bank-
ruptcy. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1946).
Restriction aims at protection of general creditors from exhaustion of the bankrupt's
estate. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1936) ; H.R, REP. No. 1409,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1937). It was not intended that a lien be restricted for the
benefit of other liens, so the Chandler Act provided for restriction "except as against
other liens." This provision proved inadequate to protect general creditors. In re Eakin
Lumber Co., 39 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. W. Va. 1941), aff'd sub norn. R.F.C. v. Sun Lumber
Co., 126 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1942) ; In re Michael's Cafeteria, 49 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. La.
1943), modified on rehearing, 52 F. Supp. 799 (D. La. 1943). A new anendment to 67(c)
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ordinary claimant will share with general creditors after all 64a priorities
are paid. And even if subordinated lienors themselves are entitled to a 64a
priority, they would, with the exception of wage claimants (who possess a
second priority anyway), 13 receive a higher rank in the order of payment.
By virtue of their subordinated liens, landlords, otherwise usually entitled
to a fifth priority,14 take precedence over the third priority (creditors' ex-
penses of proving the debtor's misconduct in the bankruptcy proceedings) 15
and the fourth priority (tax% claims).1 This elevation may enhance the
claimant's chances of recovery since tax claims often take a large bite of the
debtor's remaining assets. 17 Tax claims, normally accorded a fourth priority
in the absence of a lien, rise above the third priority too. This jump itself
is likely to be inconsequential because of the typically low claims of the third
priority.' s But the amount allowed on the tax claims may be increased, the
fourth priority specifying that "no order shall be made for the payment
of a tax assessed against any property of the bankrupt in excess of the value
of the interest of the bankrupt estate therein" is interpreted by some ctsurts to
mean that the excess of a tax claim should not even be allowed as a general
claim.' 9 Since 67c contains no similar proscription, the excess of a suh-
ordinated tax lien might be paid as a general claim.
In 1952, Congress again critically considered state statutory liens and re-
stricted them further.20 Former 67c became 67 c(1) and subdivision (2) was
added, which provides that:
"[S]tatutory liens created or recognized by the laws of any State
for debts owing to any person, including any State or any subdivision
now permits the trustee to "take over" the uxckss of restricted liens as vell as the entire
amcount of liens voided by 67(c) (2) (see text at p. 1134 infra) for the benefit of the
estate. This clearly makes restrictions serve the interests of the general creditors. t6i
ST.T. 427, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c) (Supp. 1952).
13. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1946) ; In re Empire Granite Co.,
42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942); In re Auto Electric and Repair Parts Co., 41 F. Supp.
3 (W.D. Ky. 1941); I re Penticoff, 36 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1941).
14. The fifth priority includes landlords' claims for rent only if they are entitled to
priority under state law. 52 ST.AT. 174 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (5) (194G).
15. 52 ST.T. 874 (1938), as amended, 63 STA-T. 108 (1949), 11 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (3)
(Supp. 1952).
16. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (194ti).
17. See 4 CoLLmR, BANKRUPTCY 163 (14th ed., Moore, 1942).
18. Ibid.
19. See cases and discussion in MOORE & COLTTRYM.A-x., Dmrioas' %.;D CnRn orns'
RIGHTS 1073 n.4 (1951).
20. 66 STAT. 427, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(c) (Supp. 1952). This time Congress was
apparently aiming at state liens which attach to a debtor's property generally, termed
"floating liens." Such liens, it was felt, are indistinguishable from priorities; the favored
creditor asserts the full amount of his claim against all the property in the estate at the
time of bankruptcy and is paid before general creditors. H.R. RIT. No. 2324, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1952).
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thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession of,
or by levy upon or by sequestration or distraint of, such property,
shall not be valid against the trustee....
Liens on personalty not enforced by sale prior to bankruptcy remain within
the sweep of 67c. Nor does the 1952 amendment alter the status of non-
statutory liens of distress for rent and federal statutory liens: the former
will be subordinated if not already enforced by sale, the latter if not enforced
by sale prior to bankruptcy and not accompanied by possession. But 67c(1),
in view of the new subdivision (2), will subordinate state statutory liens not
enforced by sale prior to bankruptcy and not accompanied by possession
only if they are accompanied by levy, sequestration, or distraint.2 2 Subdi-
vision (2) invalidates state statutory liens not enforced by sale prior to bank-
ruptcy and not accompanied by possession or by levy, sequestration, or
distraint. Thus the significance of the 1952 amendment should be readily
apparent to the state statutory lienor: -he retains some benefits from his lien if
he falls under (1), but is relegated to the status of a general creditor if he
comes within (2).
Even with the restrictive effect of the 1952 amendment, Section 67c remains
an imperfect implementation of Congress' desire to preserve the Bankruptcy
Act's order of payment. Section 67c still appplies only to statutory liens on
personalty; yet statutory liens on realty may constitute a greater threat to the
Act's payment scheme since they probably consume a larger share of the
bankrupt's estate.23 Moreover, holders of statutory liens on personalty may
continue to disrupt the hierarchy of payment. Statutory lienors can escape
67c completely by foreclosing their liens prior to bankruptcy, or, with the
exception of landlords with a lien of distress for rent, by obtaining possession
of the encumbered property; and while the federal government as tax lienor
qualifies for 67c(1) without taking any steps to protect its lien, state statutory
lienors can come under 67c(1) by acquiring a levy, sequestration, or distraint.
21. 66 STAT. 427, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (2) (Supp. 1952).
22. State statutory liens of distress for rent: From an independent reading of the two
subdivisions, 67(c) (1) would apply to all state statutory liens of distress for rent. Yct
67(c) (2) covers some of the same ground, since it applies to state statutory liens of distress
for rent not accompanied by possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint. A harinoiou
interpretation of the subdivisions requires 67(c) (1) to be read as applicable, not to all
state statutory liens of distress for rent, but only to those accompanied by either possession,
levy, sequestration, or distraint: all others fall under 67(c) (2).
State statutory non-rent lics: While both subdivisions apply to non-rent state statu-
tory liens only when the lienor has no possession, 67(c) (2) does not come into play unless
the lienor also lacks levy, sequestration, or distraint. On a literal reading of the statute,
67(c) (1) would seem to apply to liens that fall under 67(c) (2), since such liens would
not be accompanied by possession. To avoid this, the subdivision must be read so that
liens not accompanied by possession fall under 67(c) (1) only when levy, sequestration, or
distraint is present: in their absence, such liens are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
67(c) (2).
23. See 4 Coijum, BANRUPrCY 166 (14th ed., Moore, 1942).
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But 67c(2) may have been enacted to encourage statutory lienors to give
public notice of the existence of their liens, in order to prevent extension
of credit on encumbered property by unsuspecting creditors.2 4 This goal, how-
ever, is incompatible with the section's primary objective. To the extent
creditors receive public notice through possession, levy, sequestration, or
distraint, the Act's hierarchy of payrnent will be upset: maximum attainment
of the notoriety aim will cause maximum interference with the Act's pay-
ment scheme. Aside from this incompatibility of aims, the section's ability to
promote notoriety of liens is probably limited. Since the section is restricted
to liens on personalty, 67c(2) does not encourage public notice of realty
liens. In fact, 67b may allow perfection of realty liens after bankruptcy if the
state statutory period for perfection has not elapsed.25 Moreover, even as
to statutory liens on personalty, 67c ignores public notice by recordation.
Some states allow or require perfection in this way3 And recordation, especially
in states where it is the required method of perfection, might provide more
effective notice than possession, levy, sequestration, or distraint.
The increasing antipathy toward statutory liens on personalty, evidenced
by the 1938 and 1952 amendments to the Act, may signal a trend toward
complete withdrawal of protection for such liens in bankruptcy proceedings.
Such a goal seems eminently desirable. The Act now offers 64a priorities to
groups that are generally thought to merit special consideration: wage
earners, landlords, state and federal taxing authorities. Congress could enact
additional priorities if other creditors were thought deserving of special treat-
24. It is not clear that the Chandler Act provision vas intended to promote notice.
The National Bankruptcy Conference Report, ANALYSIS oF H.R. 12Z9, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 212 (1936), does not indicate this purpose, nor does the Committee Report on the
Chandler Act, H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). But several courts have
suggested "notice" as an aim of the section. Sc Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforce-
ment of California, 336 U.S. 118, 127-9 (1949); City of New York v. Hall, 139 F2d 935,
936 (2d Cir. 1944). The 1952 House of Representatives Committee Report hints that
notice was intended; and to explain why liens on realty were not made subject to 67(c),
it states: "A lien upon real estate is commonly dealt with adequately by recording
acts .. " H.R. REin. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952). Since the primary function
of recording is notice, this implies that notice was a goal of 67(c).
It is possible that notice was not an objective of the Chandler Act, and that the notion
was voiced in the cases by judges who, in other situations, were accustomed to viewing
possession as a means of giving notice.
25. E.g., In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 163 F2fd 803 (6th Cir. 1943).
26. Most wage liens require recording within a specified time to prevent expiration
of the lien. See R.F.C. v. Sun Lumber Co., 126 F.2d 731, 739 (4th Cir. 1942); In re
Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co., 114 F.2d 1010, 1012-3 (3d Cir. 1940), ceri. denecd sub
non. Stem v. Pennsylvania Brewing Co., 312 U.S. 685 (1941) ; I s re Empire Granite Co.,
42 F. Supp. 450, 454 (M.D. Ga. 1942). "Perfection" or "fixing" of liens often means re-
cording. See IL.T ANN. STAT. c. 82, §§ 41-2, 52 (Smith-Hurd, 1935); id. §§ 78, 97
(Supp. 1952) ; 5 OHIo GE:N. CoDa ANN. §§ 8324, 8332, 8340, 8378 (Page, 1933); 16 Tax.
Crv. STAT. ANN. tit. 90, arts. 5453, 5476, 5486 (Vernon, 1925).
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ment. However, even limited recognition of statutory liens abdicates to the
states the responsibility for defining the range of needy creditor groups. As
a result, uniformity among the states is lost, and some creditors may benefit to
the detriment of others who, in Congress' mind, are equally deserving. And
these considerations apply to statutory liens on realty as well as personalty.
Judicious use of the power to enact 64a priorities may be a simple and effective
substitute for the patchwork that is now 67b and 67c.
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